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GETTING TO KNOW HARLAN: A NEW 
APPROACH TO JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY? 
THE REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO JOHN 
MARSHALL HARLAN. By Linda Przybyszewski.1 
University of North Carolina Press. 1999. Pp. xii, 286. 
Hardcover, $49.95; Paper, $19.95. 
James A. Thomson2 
Is there reason to rejoice? Clearly, there ought to be only 
one answer: Yes. Although "[m]any aspects of Harlan's life and 
work remain unexplored" in The Republic According to John 
Marshall Harlan,3 this apparent weakness of Professor Linda 
Przybyszewski 's biography engenders pleasure, not regret. 
"[A )bsence" of these details serves as "an invitation for others to 
join the conversation" that this biography has "tried to begin. "4 
(p. 9) In an endeavor "to try something different," (p. 9) The 
Republic According to John Marshall Harlan casts aside "the di-
lemma of judicial biography" (p. 8) created by "the search for" 
(p. 1) or "pursuit of [judicial) greatness. "5 (p. 8) Traditionally, 
1. Assistant Professor of History, University of Cincinnati. 
2. LL.B (Hons) 1971, B.A. 1974, University of Western Australia; LL.M 1975, 
S.J.D. 1981, Harvard University. 
3. Linda Przybyszewski, The Republic According to John Marshal/Harlan 9 (U. of 
North Carolina Press, 1999). For initial reviews sec Mary Frances Berry, Book Review, 
87 1. Am. Hist. 1050 (2000); Tony A. Freyer, Prophet or Example, 24 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 325 
(1999). 
4. Other scholarship by Pncybyszewski on Harlan includes Mrs John Marshall 
Harlan's Memories: Hierarchies of Gender and Race in the Household and Polity, 18 L. & 
Soc. Inquiry 453 (1993); The Evolution of John Marshall Harlan the Elder, in Walter D. 
Pederson and 1'\orman W. Provizcr, eds., Great Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court: Rat-
ings and Case Studies 101-23 (Peter Lang Publishing, 1993); John Marshall Harlan, in 
Melvin I. Urofsky, cd., The Supreme Court Justices: A Biographical Dictionary 205-13 
(Garland Publishing, 1994); Book Review, 16 L. & Hist. Rev. 191 (1998); The Religion of 
a Jurist: Justice David J. Brewer and the Christian Nation, 25 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 228 (2000); 
The Republic According to John Marshall Harlan: Race, Republicanism, and Citizenship 
(Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1989). Sec also, Linda Przybyszewski, The Dilemma of 
Judicial Biography Or Who Cares Who Is the Grear Appellate Judge? Gerald Gunther on 
Learned Hand, 21 L. & Soc. Inquiry 135 (1996). 
5. Other biographies include Loren P. Beth, John Marshall Harlan: The Last Whig 
Justice (U. Press of Kentucky, 1992); Tinsley E. Yarbrough, Judicial Enigma: The First 
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two interrelated objectives have motivated judicial biographers: 
to provide "models of civic behavior" (p. 206) and to prove that 
the judge is great. Achieving both, Przybyszewski suggests, has 
depended on how a judge performs when assessed against "five 
tests" for greatness: "wisdom, economic progressivism, vindica-
tion by history, integrity, and Holmes."6 (p. 5) However, this 
"definition of greatness" (p. 8) creates rather than solves the di-
lemma of conventional judicial biography. The reason is obvi-
ous: greatness and its criteria are a contingent "historical arti-
fact." (p. 8) Consequently, by confining their attention to issues 
and evidence relevant to those matters, judicial biographers are 
too selective in their objectives and methodologies. Inevitably, 
"topics" of "importance" to the judge are "neglected." (p. 8) At 
least from Przybyszewski's perspective, the traditional failure to 
consider "historical circumstances" demands a new and different 
approach to judicial biography. (p. 8) 
Professor Przbyszewski adopts different methodologies and 
objectives, as well as an "alternative" interpretation of the Civil 
War's effect "on legal thought." (p. 11) This attempt to push 
judicial biography into new and perhaps unexplored domains, 
however, relies on familiar rather than unexpected means. Ne-
glected source materials, for example, illuminate specific aspects 
of Harlan's life and beliefs. Chronological sequencing and de-
tailed doctrinal narratives are deliberately eschewed. Instead, 
Harlan's ruminations on law and the nation as well as his nonju-
dicial activities are accorded greater prominence and more sig-
nificance than in traditional judicial biographies. Indeed, Profes-
sor Przybyszewski's conclusions are based on the connections 
between these issues and Harlan's judicial opinions. For exam-
ple, Professor Przbyszewski describes Harlan's constitutional ju-
Justice Harlan (Oxford U. Press, 1995). Revival of scholarly interest in Harlan is demon-
strated by Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 
Iowa L. Rev. 151 (1996); Gabriel J. Chin, The First Justice Harlan by the Numbers: Just 
How Great was "The Great Dissenter?," 32 Akron L. Rev. 629 (1999); Molly Townes 
O'Brien, Justice John Marshall Harlan as Prophet· The Plessy Dissenter's Color-Blind 
Constitution, 6 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 753 (1998); C. Ellen Connally, Justice Harlan's 
"Great Betrayal"? A Reconsideration of Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Educa-
tion, 25 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 72 (2000); David E. Bernstein, Plessy versus Lochner: The Berea 
College Case, 25 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 93 (2000); Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Road to Twining: 
Reassessing the Disincorporation of the Bill of Rights, 61 Ohio St. L.J. 1457, 1463-1515 
(2000); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Harlan, Holmes and the Passions of Justice, in Susan A. 
Bandes, ed., The Passions of Law 330-62 (New York U. Press, 1999); Mark Curriden and 
Leroy Phillips, Jr., Contempt of Court: The Tum-of-the-Century Lynching that Launched 
ZOO Years of Federalism (Faber and Faber, Inc., 1999). 
6. For further elaboration see Przybyszewski, 21 L. & Soc. Inquiry at 135-52 (cited 
in note 4). 
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risprudence as an endeavor to preserve and protect the Union. 
If this required decisions curtailing corporate power or eroding 
white supremacy, Harlan delivered the necessary opinions, 
though often in dissent. (pp. 2, 9, 11, 12) 
Inevitably, in the presence of previous methodological con-
tests over judicial biography,7 Professor Przybyszewski's sug-
gested "new approach" raises an obvious question: Does The 
Republic According to John Marshall Harlan succeed? Professor 
Przybyszewski's alternative approach rests on three interwoven 
premises. First, "primary sources" provide a basis from which 
to extract interpretations and explanations of a Justice's "ideas," 
"experiences" and "transformation."8 (pp. 2, 11) Second, those 
sources ought to include "nonjudicial thoughts and actions," for 
example "religious faith or literary accomplishments," which are 
"importan[t]," but "neglected," in judicial biographies. (pp. 2, 8, 
9) Third, "[e]ach chapter" of The Republic According to John 
Marshall Harlan "relies on particular primary sources that have 
been neglected by other historians." (p. 9) 
Repetition of one word- "neglected"- (pp. 2, 3, 8, 9, 45) 
invites two questions: What are the "neglected" primary 
sources? Have they in fact been "neglected"? Arguably, three 
sources have been neglected: Malvina Shanklin Harlan's mem-
oirs;9 "a verbatim transcript [of some 500 pages] of Harlan's 
7. See generally J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Alpheus T. Mason and the Art of Judi-
cial Biography, 8 Const. Comm. 41 (1991); Clyde Spillenger, Lifting the Veil: The Judicial 
Biographies of Alpheus T. Mason, 21 Rev. Am. Hist. 723 (1993); G. Edward White, The 
Renaissance of Judicial Biography, 23 Rev. Am. Hist. 71 (1995); Michael J. Gerhardt, The 
Art of Judicial Biography, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1595 (1995); Symposium: National Confer-
ence on Judicial Biography, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 485-809 (1995); John C. Jeffries, The Ath-
lete as Judge, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 495 (1996); Stephen J. Wermel, Writing Supreme Court 
Biography: A Single Lens View of a Nine-Sided Image, [1994] J. Sup. Ct. Hist 9; Laura 
Kalman, The Power of Biography, 23 L. & Soc. Inquiry 479 (1998); Gerald Gunther, A 
Model Judicial Biography, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2117 (1999). For debates about techniques in 
other biographical scholarship see Harry Watson, Lies and Times: The Changing Genre 
of Biography, 28 Rev. Am. Hist. 45 (2000); Hermione Lee, Tracking the Untrackable, 
April 12, 2001, N.Y. Rev. of Books 53 (reviewing Richard Holmes, Sidetracks: Explora-
tions of a Romantic Biographer (Pantheon, 2000)); David Ellis, Literary Lives: Biography 
and the Search for Understanding (Routledge, 2000); Paul R. Backscheider, Reflections 
on Biography (Oxford U. Press, 2000)). 
8. For locations and descriptions of the Harlan Papers, see, e.g., Alexandra K. 
Wigdor, The Personal Papers of Supreme Court Justices: A Descriptive Guide 114-17 
(Garland Publishing, 1986); Yarbrough, Judicial Enigma at 271-72 (cited in note 5). 
Some Harlan papers have been published. See, e.g., Ellwood Lewis, The Appointment of 
Mr Justice Harlan, 29 Ind. L.J. 46 (1953); Alan F. Westin, The First Justice Harlan: A Self-
Portrait from His Private Papers, 46 Ky. L.J. 321 (1958). This is only a fragment com-
pared to publication of other justices' papers. Compare, e.g., G. Edward White, Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes: Law and the Inner Self591-93 (Oxford U. Press, 1993). 
9. Malvina S. Harlan, Some Memories of a Long Life, 1854-1911 (1915) (repro-
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1897-98 lectures on constitutional law" delivered at Columbian 
University (subse~uently George Washington University) in 
Washington, D.C.; 0 and "a list drawn up by Harlan in 1910 of 
[his majority and dissenting Supreme Court] oRinions that he 
wanted republished together in a single volume." 1 
Mrs Harlan's memoirs are almost exclusively confined to 
their nearly fifty years of marriage. As Professor Przybyszewski 
clearly conveys, its narrative descriptions of their household ac-
tivities and domestic arrangements reveal Justice Harlan's ubiq-
uitous paternalism. Did that influence his civil rights positions, 
including deviations from a color-blind standard? Without 
equivocation, The Republic According to John Marshall Harlan 
provides an affirmative response. (pp. 42, 43) In contrast, two 
law students' "verbatim transcript" of Harlan's lectures are an 
analysis and dissection of each clause in the U.S. Constitution 
and corresponding Supreme Court interpretations. (p. 44) Even 
so, for Professor Przybyszewski, these recitations provide much 
more: a judicial philosophy of legal formalism, a panoramic op-
timist's view of American history, and faith in the Constitution. 
(pp. 44-72) Comparatively, Harlan's chronological list of 83 of 
his judicial opinions is much sparser. Professor Przybyszewski 
nevertheless treats that concise list as an invitation to engage in a 
careful exegisis of each opinion and to search for a more pano-
duced in 26 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 109-211 (2001)). This was "a 188 page typescript autobiog-
raphy." Alan F. Westin, John Marshall Harlan and the Constitutional Rights of Negroes: 
The Transformation of a Southerner, 66 Yale L.J. 637, 642 n.l5 (1957). It is partially re-
produced in Westin, 46 Ky. L.J. at 329-32 (cited in note 8). For a description, discussion 
and analysis see Przybyszewski, Mrs John Marshall Harlan's Memories (cited in note 4); 
Przybyszewski, Harlan at 15-43 (cited in note 3). See also id. at 29 (noting that the 
Harlans were married for "almost fifty-five years"). 
10. Przybyszewski, Harlan at 3, 44 (cited in note 3) (referring to John Marshall 
Harlan, Constitutional Law Lectures, 1897-98 (unpublished manuscript, John Marshall 
Harlan Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division)). For a description, discussion 
and analysis see Przybyszewski, Harlan at 44-72 (cited in note 3). Professor Przy-
byszewski is "preparing an edition of these lectures." The Evolution at 120 n.32 (cited in 
note 4). Also at Columbian University, "Harlan began teaching domestic relations, torts, 
and commercial law in 1891" but "no notes or lectures on Harlan's domestic relations 
course ... seem to have survived." (pp. 85, 226 n. 24) 
11. Przybyszewski, Harlan at 3 (cited in note 3); see id. at 209-11 (reproducing the 
list). "The list is undated, but Harlan probably wrote it during the summer of 1910. The 
last decision listed was delivered in the spring of 1910." The absence of two decisions, 
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) and United States v. 
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911) leads Professor Przybyszewski to conclude 
that Harlan drafted the list in 1910 and never revised it in 1911. Przybyszewski, Harlan at 
174, 178. Professor Przybyszewski "cannot imagine that [Harlan] would have left the 
Great Trust Cases of 1911 out of an accounting of his legacy to the nation." (ld. at 178) 
Harlan died, in office, on Saturday, October 14, 1911. For a description, discussion and 
analysis of this list, see id. at 147-87. 
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ramie understanding of Harlan's "coherent legal vision." (p. 
152) 
It is not plausible to contend that Malvina Harlan's memoirs 
have been neglected. Scholars have frequently used and repro-
duced them.12 According to Professor Przybyszewski, however, 
previous biographers' motivation "to prove that John (Marshall 
Harlan] was a great judge" rendered that use "far less cautious." 
(p. 18) Only the other sources, which Professor Przybyszewski 
describes as "treasures" and "extraordinary documents," have 
escaped close scholarly attention. (p. 3) Previous publications 
have disclosed that Harlan gave lectures, including a constitu-
tional law course at Columbian University. 13 Indeed, other Jus-
tices, including Story, Wilson, Miller, and Brewer, have done the 
same.14 The difference is the perspective and significance that 
The Republic According to John Marshall Harlan extracts from 
those lectures.15 
Much less, if any, prior attention has focused on Harlan's 
list of opinions. Given this neglect and that these 83 opinions 
represent a miniscule fraction of the 14,226 cases in which 
Harlan participated/6 how and why does Przybyszewski justify 
12. Sec, e.g., Westin, 66 Yale L.J. at 638 (cited in note 9); David Farrelly, Harlan's 
Formative Period: The Years Before the War, 46 Ky. L.J. 367 (1958). 
13. See, e.g., Alan F. Westin, Out-of-Court Commentary by United States Supreme 
Court Justices, 1790-1962: Of Free Speech and Judicial Lockjaw, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 633, 
665 (1962) (listing Harlan's bibliography "Lectures on Constitutional Law, Transcript of 
Law Lectures for 1897-1898, Columbian Law School"); Yarbrough, Judicial Enigma at 
213-15 (cited in note 5) (teaching from 1891-1910); Beth, John Marshall Harlan: The Last 
Whig Justice at 144, 171 (cited in note 5) (suggesting that Harlan began teaching at Co-
lumbian Law School in 1884 and that he "taught at the summer session of the University 
of Virginia Law School, and gave a series of lectures on the Constitution at Northwestern 
University"); Florian Bartosic, The Constitution, Civil Liberties and John Marshall 
Harlan, 46 Ky. L.J. 407,413-14 (1958). 
14. See, e.g., R. Kent Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of 
the Old Republic 253-62 (U. North Carolina Press, 1985) (Harvard Law School lectures); 
MichaelJ. Brodhead, David I. Brewer: The Life of a Supreme Court Justice, 1837-1910 at 
131-32 (Southern Illinois U. Press, 1994) (Columbian University lectures); Westin at 62 
Colum. L. Rev. at 648-50 (cited in note 13) (noting Justices Story, Wilson, and Baldwin's 
constitutional law lectures); Przybyszewski, Harlan at 58, 252 (cited in note 3) (Miller's 
lectures). 
15. "Linda Carol Przybyszewski devotes considerable attention to an analvsis of 
Harlan's lectures. Arguably, however, his judicial opinions offer considerably greater 
insight into his judicial and constitutional philosophy." Yarbrough, Judicial Enigma at 
266 n.43 (cited in note 5). 
16. The list is "fifty-nine majority opinions and twenty-four dissents." Przy-
byszcwski, Harlan at 148 (cited in note 3). For the 14,226 cases sec Alan F. Westin, Mr. 
Justice Harlan, in Allison Dunham and Philip B. Kurland, cds., Mr. Justice 93, 117 (U. 
Chicago Press, rev. ed. 1964). See also Westin, 66 Yale L.J. at 699 n.283 (cited in note 9) 
(similar figures). Compare the different total numbers of Harlan's opinions given in Bar-
tosic, 46 Ky. L.J. at 408 (cited in note 13); Henry 1. Abraham, John Marshall Harlan: A 
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this list's prominence? Harlan's perspective is paramount. Were 
these 83 opinions "his favorite decisions" or do they constitute 
something more: his "legacy"? (p. 147) By focusing on them, 
can a biographer "understand how [Harlan] conceived of his 
work on the [Supreme] Court"? (p. 148) Indeed, should signifi-
cance be attributed to the appearance on this list of individual, 
albeit now famous, opinions such as Plessy? (p. 148) If so, does 
sheer numerical weight-the repetition of more obscure opin-
ions dealing with the same subject matter, such as, the states' po-
lice power over "health, safety and morals"(p. 149)-mean even 
more? 
On each issue The Republic According to John Marshall 
Harlan provides an affirmative answer. Professor Przybyszewski 
relentlessly builds upon this foundation to reach three predict-
able conclusions. First, Harlan had "a coherent legal vision." (p. 
152) Indeed, Harlan attained this coherence by simultaneously 
advancing substantive due process and nationalization of the Bill 
of Rights. For Harlan, free labor ideology and civil rights were 
compatible, not contradictory. Second, pushed by the Thir-
teenth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Civil War, one ob-
jective was responsible for Harlan's vision: "nationalism. "17 (p. 
152) In this context, Przybyszewski suggests that Harlan's pri-
vate letters provide supporting evidence. (pp. 148, 170-178) 
Third, Harlan recognized and, via his list of opinions, publicly 
acknowledged a disjuncture between his civil rights decisions. 
For example, the Civil Rights Cases18and Pless/9 were to be 
"remembered" but others, such as Cumming v. Richmond 
County Board of Education, 20 were "failures." (p. 117) 
Even if these conclusions are purely conjectural, this use of 
Harlan's list, Harlan's lectures and private letters/1 and Malvina 
Justice Neglected, 41 Va. L. Rev. 871, 872 (1955) (similar figures). Przybyszewski utilizes 
Westin's figures and discusses one Harlan circuit court opinion. Przybyszewski, Harlan 
at 76, 147, 169-70,236 n.l (cited in note 3) (discussing Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310 (1894) 
(7th Cir.)). 
17. For Harlan's changing views-from anti to pro-"the Civil War amendments" 
see Westin, 66 Yale L.J. at 653-63 (cited in note 9). But see Yarbrough, Judicial Enegma 
at 162 (cited in note 5) (agreeing with Felix Frankfurter's view that this change was moti-
vated to quell opposition to Harlan's Supreme Court appointment). 
18. 109 u.s. 3 (1883). 
19. 163 u.s. 537 (1896). 
20. 175 U.S. 528 (1899). 
21. For example, Harlan notes that "only one income tax decision [Pollock v. 
Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895)] is listed, but Harlan's letters tell us 1t 
meant a lot to him." Przybyszewski, Harlan at 148 (cited in note 3). See also id. at 170-78 
(discussing case and letters and concluding that "Ha~lan's private corresponde~ce shows 
how much the Civil War had shaped his understanding of what had happened m the In-
2001) BOOK REVIEWS 653 
Harlan's memoirs leads Professor Przybyszewski to something 
more. At least compared to other scholarship, The Republic Ac-
cording to John Marshall Harlan provides different interpreta-
tions of Harlan's judicial opinions and their larger, undisclosed 
motivations, reasons, and causes. 
At this juncture, a more fundamental question emerges: 
does Professor Przybyszewski deliver "a new approach to the 
study of judges"? (p. 11) The Republic According to John Mar-
shall Harlan may move future judicial biographies away from a 
quest for greatness and toward an explanation of jurists within 
their historical context and milieu. For example, Professor 
Przybyszewski unabashedly elides endeavors to connect or disas-
sociate Harlan and his "color-blind" characterization of the Con-
stitution in Pless/2 from contemporary perspectives of Brown 23 
or affirmative action.24 In this context, speculation about what 
Harlan would have done in 1996, the centenary of Plessy, is 
characterized as "silly." (p. 203) The reason is obvious. Harlan 
can only be understood and explained "through the historical 
circumstances in which he lived. It's impossible to rip him out of 
those circumstances, stick him in ours, and watch him go." (p. 
203) Instead, Professor Przybyszewski uses Malvina Harlan's 
memoirs to interpret what Harlan's Plessy dissent meant to him 
and his Supreme Court colleagues. 
Two factors are paramount: Harlan's paternalism and ra-
cism. Professor Przybyszewski believes that racism in particular 
explains why Harlan, despite being prepared to enforce and es-
pouse racial equality in relation to civil and political rights such 
as travelling on public transport, jury service, and voting, (p. 97) 
"hesitated" and preferred "avoiding" to do so when social rights 
such as "interracial marriages or schools" were involved. (pp. 
come Tax Case"). 
22. "Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows or tolerates classes among 
citizens." Plessy 163 U.S. at 559. For the origins and three different interpretations of 
this sentence, see James A. Thomson, Swimming in the Air: Melville W. Fuller and the 
Supreme Court 1888-1910, 27 Cumb. L. Rev. 139, 168 n.191(1997). For a bibliography of 
Plessy and differing interpretations of its majority and dissenting opinions, see Thomson 
at 173 n.212, 177-84; Chin, 82 Iowa L. Rev. at 630 n.lO (cited in note 5) (subsequent 
scholarship); Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 Vand. L. 
Rev. 881 (1998); Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 303; Michael J. 
Klarman, Neither Hero, Nor Villain: The Supreme Court, Race and the Constitution in the 
Twentieth Century (Chapter 1: The Plessy Era) (Oxford U. Press, forthcoming). 
23. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
24. For the reversal of positions (from the 1940s to the 1990s) of liberals and 
conservatives over the relationship between Plessy and Brown and between Plessy and 
race-conscious affirmative action, see Thomson, 27 Cumb. L. Rev. at 168-70, 180-84 
(cited in note 22). 
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116, 117) Ultimately, Professor Przybyszewski maintains that 
paternalism and racism solve what other Harlan biographers 
leave as an unanswered puzzle: an apparently irreconcilable con-
tradiction in Harlan's decisions and opinions between the Civil 
Rights, 25 Plessy6 and Berea College7 cases and the Pace28 and 
Cummini9 cases. (p. 116) 
Whatever its other merits, Professor Przybyszewski's expo-
sition is neither startling nor novel. This tripartite rights struc-
ture-civil, political, and social-was not unusual.30 Its existence 
has been known to other scholars.31 Of course, Harlan, without 
undermining that structural edifice,32 moved public accommoda-
tion (in the Civil Rights Cases) and transport (in Plessy) from so-
cial to civil rights?3 To that extent, Harlan can be praised as ex-
ceptional.34 However, even Professor Przybyszewski concedes 
that more than this cannot be claimed: 
3). 
Harlan was unwilling to make further alterations [for exam-
ple, in Pace and Cumming] in the three-part system of [civil, 
political, and social] rights . . . . In fact, clutching at greatness 
25. 109 U.S. 3 (1883) discussed in Przybyszewski, Harlan at 90-95 (cited in note 3). 
26. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (discussed in Przybyszewski, Harlan at 95-99 (cited in note 
27. 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (upholding, on non-constitutional grounds, Kentucky law 
requiring racial segregation in private schools) discussed in Przybyszewski, Harlan at 106· 
09 (cited in note 3); Bernstein, 25 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. (cited in note 5); and Westin, 66 Yale 
L.J. at 690, 708-09 (cited in note 9). But see Yarbrough, Judicial Enigma at 162 (cited in 
note 5) (noting that Harlan's dissent expressly did not address the constitutionality of 
segregation in public state schools); Charles Nesson, The Harlan-Frankfurter Connection: 
An Aspect of Justice Harlan's Education, 36 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 179, 183-85 (1991) (Felix 
Frankfurter's view that Harlan would have upheld the constitutional validity of segrega· 
tion in public schools). 
28. 106 U.S. 583 (1882) (holding that Alabama law, which more severely punished 
interracial adultery than that between same-race persons, did not contravene 14th 
Amendment's equal protection clause) discussed in Przybyszewski, Harlan at 109-15 
(cited in note 3). 
29. 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (refusal to grant injunction to compel the County Board of 
Education, via the denial of tax-support, to close the white public high school until the 
Board reopened the black high school) discussed in Przybyszewski, Harlan at 99-102 
(cited in note 3); Connally, 25 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. (cited in note 5); and Westin, 66 Yale L.J. 
at 689 (cited in note 9). 
30. Przybyszewski, Harlan at 81, 84 (cited in note 3) ("Nineteenth-century white 
Americans spoke of three kinds of rights: civil, political, and social" and "the common 
three-part system of rights"). 
31. I d. at 81-85. 
32. However, this might indicate that "Harlan demonstrated that ideas about rights 
had a dynamism of their own." Id. at 84. 
33. Id. at 84. 
34. Id. at 86, 117. Others, such as "congressional Republicans like [Senator 
Charles] Sumner who tried to reposition the line between social and civil rights," must 
also be included. Id. at 83. 
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is especially inappropriate here [in the context of Harlan's 
understanding of race and its relationship to rights] because it 
turns out that the beliefs that made Harlan's famous dissents 
possible also underlay his less-admired decisions. 35 
655 
In addition, Professor Przybyszewski recounts "three sto-
ries" (p. 86) concerning Harlan's non judicial activities. First is 
"the struggle of Harlan and his black ally Reverend Francis J. 
Grirnke to prevent segregation in the [New York Avenue] Pres-
byterian Church [in Washington D.C.] in 1905." (p. 86) Next, 
"Harlan and other white Presbyterians [attempted] to uplift and 
evangelise blacks while maintaining a clear social separation 
from them." (p. 87) Finally, Harlan discussed "the issue of in-
ter-racial sexual relations" in a way which demonstrated his 
"ambivalence." (p. 87) These stories, together with Malvina 
Harlan's memoirs, may well reveal "how Harlan viewed the 
black race and the rights it possessed." (p. 86) They also dem-
onstrate "how Harlan's religious and legal ideas reinforced each 
other. "36 (p. 86) 
Unfortunately, the more important and interesting question 
remains: Why did Harlan perpetuate that tripartite civil, political 
and social rights structure? Why could Harlan not completely 
abandon it? Professor Przybyszewski offers three versions of an 
unsurprising answer. At its softest: "Racial identity would have 
been lost if social equality existed." (p. 117) Next, especially 
when the undertones of white Protestant superiority are heard, is 
its more strident intonation: Harlan's "belief in an Anglo-Saxon 
heritage." (p. 116) Finally and bluntly the clear answer 
emerges: "Harlan's racialism." (p. 116) Of course, as Professor 
Przybyszewski recognizes this racialism not only "made 
[Harlan's] egalitarianism possible," but it "also accounts for the 
inconsistencies in his civil rights decisions." (p. 116) That is, 
"Harlan's racialism" was simultaneously liberating and con-
straining. "[W]hite paternalism and Anglo-Saxon racial identity 
both justified his famous dissents and limited his definition of 
civil rights." (p. 118) However, even for Harlan there was no 
liberating element for Native Americans or Chinese.37 
35. Id. at 85. 
36. At least one other scholar has suggested that Harlan "allegedly went to sleep 
with one hand upon the Constitution and the other on the Bible, and thus secured the 
untroubled sleep of the just and the righteous." G. Edward White, The American Judi-
cial Tradition: Profiles of Leading American Judges 129 (footnote omitted) (Oxford U. 
Press, 1988 expanded ed.). 
37. See Przybyszewski, Harlan at 118-22 (cited in note 3); Chin, 82 Iowa L. Rev. at 
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Indeed, these conclusions- Harlan's limited application of 
civil and political equality only to public accommodation and 
transport and private schools but not to public schools or inter-
racial adultery and his racism-resonate with other scholars' 
conclusions.38 Starkly, however, they almost reverse conclusions 
promulgated by earlier scholars who sought to revive Harlan's 
reputation. Under a sub-headinf- "The Psychological Bases of 
Harlan's Civil Rights Opinions"3 -is one example:40 
Just why Harlan gave such undeviating support to Negro civil 
rights is worth probing .... [H)e ... became the most fervent 
Republican of them all [because] ... the Negro was not a mi-
nor or occasional theme in his life; it had run like a leitmotif 
through his Kentucky career .... 
When Harlan joined the Court in 1877 ... he arrived as a 
man whose most vivid experience apart from battle had been 
his conversion on the civil rights issue. To justify his basic 
shift in philosophy in 1868, Harlan had to convince himself 
that he had been wrong-completely and dangerously 
wrong-in his earlier pro-slavery views.... [J]ust as a reli-
gious or political convert will hold his faith more strongly, 
even more combatively, than the born believer, so Justice 
Harlan had become a staunch supporter of Negro civil 
rights . . . . In addition ... Harlan came to associate his warm 
personal memories of the Civil War with the cause of the Ne-
gro.... [Harlan) assimilate[d) his attitude toward Negroes 
into the moral and political fundamentalism that was his basic 
framework. 41 
In the context of this transformation thesis,42 one effect of 
Professor Przybyszewski's conclusions is obvious: Harlan's per-
sonal "civil rights odyssey"43 - from slavery apologist to "staunch 
supporter of Negro civil rights"44 -cannot be sustained.45 Again, 
151 (cited in note 5); Chin, 32 Akron L. Rev. at 629 (cited in note 5). But sec Abraham, 
41 Va. L. Rev. at 880-81 (cited in note 16) (Harlan "had come to feel genuine concern for 
the plight of the Negro, a concern that he continually echoed for other minorities as well, 
such as the Chinese and the American Indians") (footnotes omitted); Henry J. Abraham, 
John Marshall Harlan: The Justice and the Man, 46 Ky. L.J. 448,466 (1958) (same). 
38. Sec, e.g., Yarbrough, Judicial Enigma at 160-62 (cited in note 5); Chin, 32 Ak-
ron L. Rev. (cited in note 5). 
39. Westin, 66 Yale L.J. at 697 (cited in note 9). 
40. See also Abraham, 41 Va. L. Rev. at 880-86 (cited in note 16); Abraham, 46 Ky. 
L.J. at 465-70 (cited in note 37). 
41. Westin, 66 Yale L.J. at 697-99 (cited in note 9). 
42. Note the title of Westin, 66 Yale L.J. (cited in note 9). 
43. Id. at 638. 
44. Id. at 698. 
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it is not uncommon for biographers to promulgate a transforma-
tion thesis which other scholars endeavor to refute. Classic ex-
amples in this genre include biographies of Justices Holmes and 
Frankfurter and Chief Justice Warren.46 Of course, moving from 
one position to another, even if it involves being inconsistent, 
can often be a virtue, rather than a vice. 
The Republic According to John Marshall Harlan is not con-
fined to blacks' civil rights. Rather, Professor Przybyszewski 
uses Harlan's lectures, letters, extra-judicial speeches, and list of 
cases to analyze, probe, and provide interpretations and conclu-
sions over an extensive domain of public life and law. Seminal 
cases are obvious: Lochner, 47 the Insular cases,48 and the Income 
Tax cases.49 Professor Przybyszewski also discusses Smyth v. 
Ames;50 Hurtado v. People of California;51 and Robertson v. 
Baldwin. 51 Again, Harlan is placed within, not extrapolated 
from, his surrounding historical context: "Even Harlan's criti-
cism of corporate power was couched in free labor ideology. 
The Whig turned Republican had learned his lessons well .... 
45. Harlan (cited in note 3) repudiates the latter, rather than the earlier, part of the 
thesis. 
46. See, e.g., White, Holmes: Law and the Inner Self at 450-53 (cited in note 8); 
Melvin I. Urofsky, Felix Frankfurter: Judicial Restraint and Individual Liberties (Twayne 
Publishers, 1991); James A. Thomson, Capturing the Future: Earl Warren and Supreme 
Court History, 32 Tulsa L.J. 843, 873-74 (1997); Michael E. Parrish, Earl Warren and the 
American Judicial Tradition, 1982 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 1179. For dangers inherent in 
this genre see Suzanna Sherry, Too Clever by Half" The Problem with Novelty in Consti-
tutional Law, 95 Nw. U.L. Rev. 921, 926-30 (2001) (critiquing scholarship which promul-
gates novel or counterintuitive ideas). 
47. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Discussed in Przybyszewski, Harlan at 149-52 (cited in note 
3). See generally Thomson, 27 Cumb. L. Rev. at 174 n.212, 185-90 (cited in note 22) (bib-
liography and various interpretations). 
48. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); 
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Ga-
vieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911). 
Discussed in Przybyszewski, Harlan at 123-46 (cited in note 3). See generally James E. 
Kerr, The Insular Cases: The Role of the Judiciary in American Expansionism (Kennikat 
Press, 1982). 
49. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); Pollock v. Farm-
ers' Loan and Trust Co. (Rehearing), 158 U.S. 601 (1895). Discussed in Przybyszewski, 
Harlan at 170-73, 177-78 (cited in note 3). See generally James W. Ely, Jr., The Chief 
Justiceship of Melville W. Fuller 1888-1910 at 118-23 (U. South Carolina Press, 1995). 
50. 169 U.S. 466 (1898) (Harlan's substantive due process fair-value formula to as-
sess the reasonableness of railroad rates set by states or state agencies). 
51. 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (Harlan's dissent using 14th Amendment's due process 
clause to apply Bill of Rights to the states). Discussed in Przybyszewski, Harlan at 162-
66 (cited in note 3 ). 
52. 165 U.S. 275 (1897) (Harlan's dissent uses the 13th Amendment in relation to a 
sailor who had deserted and was returned by a U.S. marshal to the ship). Discussed in 
Przybyszewski, Harlan at 169 (cited in note 3). See generally Yarbrough,Judicial Enigma 
at 156-57, 227 (cited in note 5). 
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Like many Americans of his generation, Harlan retained a sim-
plified view of economic class even as others were complicating 
their views. There were people who worked and people who 
lived off their investments (which they were likely to have ac-
quired in some underhand way)."53 
That leads Professor Przybyszewski to an inevitable and un-
surprising conclusion: 
Instead of trying to identify Harlan as a man who tran-
scended history and was later vindicated by it, [The Republic 
According to John Marshall Harlan] has tried to show that he 
was a man with a history . . . . Harlan drew on the traditions 
in which he was raised, struggled through his own experi-
ences, and came to an explanation of what had happened and 
what would happen to himself and his country .... 
Judicial biographers' desire to prove that they are writing 
about great judges was inspired in part by the oldest justifica-
tion for biography: the attempt to supply models of civic be-
havior.... [The Republic According to John Marshall 
Harlan] offer[s] Harlan's history less as a model and more as 
evidence of the importance of the individual choices made by 
those participating in the republican project. 54 
Ironically, Harlan would have rebuffed Professor Przy-
byszewski's new approach to judicial biography. Harlan was as-
piring to greatness. On November 20, 1897, he explained to his 
constitutional law class: 
I cannot tell, except from the feeling of the ambition that is 
planted in the breast of every man to live after he is dead and 
gone in the memory of his fellow citizens ... I can understand 
why a man may be willing to give his whole life, and lead a life 
of poverty and self-denial if by doing so he can make a great 
name in his country.55 
Immediately after quoting that statement, Professor Przy-
byszewski succinctly summarizes Harlan's position: "By serving 
the Union, a man could achieve civic immortality." (p. 190) Not 
recognized or commented upon is an obvious implication: 
Harlan, unlike Professor Przybyszewski, would have supported 
53. Przybyszewski, Harlan at 184 (cited in note 3) (footnote omitted). 
54. I d. at 206-07. 
55. Harlan, Constitutional Law Lectures (cited in note 10) (quoted in Przy-
byszewski, Harlan at 190 (cited in note 3)). 
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and advocated biographies seeking and extolling greatness in 
judges. 
Especially because it confronts the strength and longevity of 
traditional approaches, The Republic According to John Mar-
shall Harlan is a bold and courageous undertaking. Whether it 
will or should accomplish Professor Przybyszewski's larger ob-
jective-the transformation from traditional to new biographical 
approaches-is much more debatable. Fortunately, however, 
this is not an aU-or-nothing proposition. Hopefully, as Professor 
Przybyszewski envisages, at least a "conversation" (p. 9) will en-
sue. If that leads to better judicial biographies, much will have 
been achieved.56 
56. For a suggestion that this may have already occurred within the parameters of 
Professor Przybyszewski's biographical scholarship see Wildenthal, 61 Ohio St. L.J. at 
1464-65 n.40 (cited in note 5) (concluding that Przybyszewski, Harlan (cited in note 3) "is 
one of the most intriguing and inspiring accounts ever written on the formation and ex-
pression of any judge's legal philosophy and work product" but "[bjecause [that] book 
substantially modifies [Przybyszewski, The Republic According to John Marshall Harlan 
(cited in note 4)] in certain ways, [Professor Wildenthal] ... cite[s] to both [that] book 
and that [Ph.D.] dissertation, as appropriate"). 
